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Abstract  
Deep decarbonisation of the electricity sector is central to achieving the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) climate policy targets for 2050 and meeting its international 
commitments under the Paris Agreement. While the overall strategy for 
decarbonising the energy system has been well established in previous studies, there 
remain deep uncertainties around the total investment cost requirements for the 
power system. The future of the power system is of critical importance because low 
carbon electricity may create significant opportunities for emissions reduction in 
buildings and transport. A key policy application of quantitative analysis using models 
is to explore how much investment needs to be mobilised for the energy transition. 
However, past estimates of energy transition costs for the UK power sector have 
focused only on 2030 rather than 2050 and consider a relatively narrow range of 
uncertainties. This paper addresses this important research gap. The UK 
government's main whole system energy economy model is linked to a power system 
model that employs an advanced approach to uncertainty analysis, combining Monte 
Carlo simulation with Modelling-to-Generate Alternatives (MGA), producing 800 
different scenario pathways. These pathways simultaneously consider uncertainties 
in policy, technology and costs. The results show that with No Climate Policy, installed 
generation capacities in 2050 are found in the range 60-75GW, while under an 80% 
Reduction in GHG Emissions, between 100GW and 130GW of plant are required. 
Meeting climate targets for 2050 is also found to increase the investment 
requirements for new electricity generation. The interquartile range for cumulative 
investments in new generation under the No Climate Policy scenario ranges from 
£60bn to £75bn, while under an 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions, investment 
requirements approximately double to £110bn - £140bn. The exercise demonstrates 
the importance of uncertainty analysis to policy evaluation, yielding insights for 
future research practice both in the UK and internationally. 
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Highlights  
 800 future transition pathways for the UK power sector explored under 
uncertainty 
 Analysis combines Monte Carlo simulation and Modelling-to-Generate-
Alternatives (MGA) 
 Many technologically diverse pathways are found to incur similar overall 
costs 
 Meeting climate targets may require an additional 25GW – 70GW of 
power capacity 
 Achieving climate targets may require additional investments of £35bn- 
£80bn  
 
1.0 Introduction: Investment needs and the key uncertainties facing the UK electricity 
sector 
The Paris Agreement commits signatories from 175 states to limiting anthropogenic 
global warming below 2°C above pre-industrial levels [1]. Achieving this objective will 
require large-scale decarbonisation of the global energy system through actions 
taken at the level of individual countries. Under Article 4, more developed countries 
are expected to take a leading role. Examples of deep decarbonisation analysis can be 
found for multiple countries, including China [2,3] , the United States [4], Germany 
[5], Denmark [6], Ireland [7] , Switzerland [8], Portugal [9] , and the United Kingdom 
[10,11]. The United Kingdom (UK) is one example of an advanced economy which is 
already committed to ambitious long-term decarbonisation targets. These targets 
are enshrined in law under the Climate Change Act 2008 [12], and are implemented as 
a series of carbon budgets subject to monitoring by an independent regulator [13]. 
Whole system analyses of long-term climate mitigation strategies for the UK that 
simultaneously evaluate options for buildings, industry, transport and energy supply 
have shown the critical role of decarbonising the UK electricity sector [14,15]. Most 
modelled UK low-carbon pathways that achieve climate targets for 2050 rely on the 
rapid decarbonisation of electricity generation before the 2030s in order to later 
electrify large fractions of building heating and road transport [16]. Model-based 
insights have led to the decarbonisation of the power sector and the electrification of 
heating and transport becoming key pillars of the UK government’s greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions reduction strategy [17–19]. However, while the strategic direction of 
travel is clear, the level of investment costs required to mobilise the energy transition 
remains an important unresolved area for policymakers. 
Previous analyses have evaluated the investment costs associated with a handful of 
potential electricity sector pathways out to the 2030s [20,21]. However, these 
pathways accounted for only a limited set of uncertainties and did not include an 
outlook to 2050 (Section 3.0). The willingness of investors to finance new low-carbon 
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generation remains a major uncertainty [22]. The 2008 financial crisis left many 
traditional financing sources, such as banks, in a weakened state and recent 
“Electricity Market Reform” measures have been designed to attract investment from 
a wider range of financial institutions [23]. However, empirical research suggests that 
institutional investors are currently deterred from placing funds into low-carbon 
infrastructures because of the perceived high risks caused by the Government’s 
uncertain strategic intentions [24]. It remains to be seen whether the UK’s current 
institutional and governance arrangements will be fit for purpose and deliver the 
required investment levels, or whether other alternatives may need to be pursued. 
Research has explored market-, state- and civic-led pathways for the electricity sector 
[25], but it remains far from clear what the most effective governance arrangements 
could be to drive the desired transition.  
Another key uncertainty is the timing for the commercial availability and deployment 
of key low-carbon generation technologies and their future costs in the period to 
2050 [22,26]. For example, new nuclear power has received significant policy support 
in the UK, but attracting investment for the first new plant, Hinkley Point C, has been 
an extremely challenging process [27]. The UK has historically been a strong 
proponent of nuclear power despite vociferous opposition from various political and 
civil society groups [28]. Nuclear power is not the only low-carbon power technology 
that potentially faces deep uncertainties and an uphill struggle. Fossil-fuelled plants 
fitted with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) have been identified as key to enabling 
an affordable transition towards UK climate targets [13,14,29]. Although pilot and 
demonstration projects are essential for the eventual commercialisation of CCS 
[30,31], in 2016 the UK Government cancelled its support for a CCS demonstration 
programme for the second time in 5 years [32]. This again increases uncertainties 
about the future costs and availability of CCS in the UK. 
Other key uncertainties highlighted in both expert elicitations and model-based 
analyses include the influence of economic growth, population demographics [26], 
and long-term shifts in energy demand resulting from changes to behaviour and 
lifestyles [33]. The costs of fossil fuels, for which the UK is a net importer, are 
uncertain and could be highly significant for the future transition [15,26,34]. The 
future availability of bioenergy resources is another widely-acknowledged uncertainty 
[35–37]. Bioenergy may be central for decarbonising many UK economic sectors such 
as industry, heating and transport. It could also be particularly important in electricity 
generation, especially when used in conjunction with CCS technology to achieve 
negative emissions [15]; though this is considered by many to be a controversial 
strategy [38].  
Finally, there are large uncertainties associated with the socio-political dimension to 
energy policy [22]. The UK Climate Change Act enjoyed broad cross-party political 
support when it was implemented in 2008, but the political appetite to strive for 
extremely challenging climate targets has yet to be seriously tested [39]. The new 
administration which came into power in July 2016 has taken the step of abolishing 
the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), potentially signalling that 
environmental issues are falling down the policy priority scale. It remains to be seen 
whether an electorate that can vote out unpopular governments will be willing to 
bear the increased and sustained costs of any future energy transition [40].  
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2.0 Study objectives 
Deep decarbonisation of the electricity system is central to achieving the UK’s climate 
targets for 2050. While the critical role of the power sector in enabling emissions 
reductions has become broadly accepted in the energy policy community, critical 
details for implementing this strategy such as understanding the total costs involved 
remain underexplored. The costs of meeting the decarbonisation challenge are 
subject to multiple uncertainties that make investment appraisals difficult. This study 
aims to review past investment analyses (Section 3.0), evaluate the current state-of-
the-art in energy modelling and uncertainty analysis (Section 4.0), and conduct an 
original UK electricity sector investment appraisal for the period 2010-2050 under a 
broad spectrum of policy, technology and cost uncertainties (Sections 5.0 and 6.0). 
Finally, the implications for UK and international energy policy and research into 
energy systems decarbonisation using quantitative models is explored (Sections 7.0 
and 8.0). 
 
3.0 Review of existing estimates of the UK electricity sector investment requirements 
Before presenting our own analysis in Sections 5.0 and 6.0, we first present a review 
of past estimates of the investment costs required to transform the UK electricity 
sector. In line with earlier overviews by Blyth et al. [41] and Trutnevyte et al. [20], a 
range of first-order estimates for investment costs from a variety of sources is shown 
in Figure 1. To enable cross-comparison across different time horizons, investment 
costs are expressed in terms of annual capital expenditure. 
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Figure 1 – Existing estimates of the UK electricity sector investment 
requirements from various industry, academic, and government sources 
[20,23,42–50] 
 
Historically, after the UK energy market liberalisation of the 1990s, investment into 
the power sector averaged around £3-4bn [20], with this rising to an average of £11bn 
from 2010 to 2013 [50]. Figure 1 shows that there is significant variation in the 
estimates of future investment requirements. This variation not only arises from the 
different time horizons considered, but also from differing assumptions with respect 
to technology-specific investment costs, electricity demand, and the future electricity 
generation mix. Despite the relatively large number of published estimates (Figure 1), 
understanding the scale of the investment challenge remains difficult. The spread of 
estimates is wide and it is not immediately clear where the differences come from. A 
cross-comparison of existing estimates is a useful starting point for discussion but 
does not begin to unpick the complex web of uncertainties affecting the future 
investment requirements. To assess these uncertainties, some of the core 
assumptions are compared in Table 1. 
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Table 1 – Uncertainties explored in existing studies of the future UK 
electricity sector investment requirements 
Study 
 
Uncertainties Explored 
 
Restricted 
commercial 
availability of 
specific 
technologies 
Technology 
costs and 
project 
finance 
Fuel costs 
Energy 
demand 
growth 
Climate 
target 
stringency / 
level of 
policy 
support 
Time 
horizon 
Trutnevyte et al. 
[20] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✕ 2050 
Ofgem Project 
Discovery [43,44] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 2025 
DECC Projections 
[46] interpreted 
by Blyth et al. [41] 
✕ ✕ ✓ ✓ ✓ 2030 
London School of 
Economics [47] ✓ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✓ 2030 
National Grid 
Future Energy 
Scenarios [21] 
✓ ✕ ✕ ✓ ✓ 2035 
Ernst and Young 
[48] ✓ ✕ ✕ ✓ ✕ 2025 
Committee on 
Climate Change 
[49] interpreted 
by Blyth et al. [41] 
using costs by 
Pöyry [51] 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✕ ✓ 2030 
 
From a methodological perspective, the studies reported in Table 1 used scenarios 
accompanied by a narrative, following a “storyline and simulation” approach [52] for 
exploring future uncertainties. Past UK Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) projections [46] incorporated Monte Carlo sampling of some key inputs. 
Trutnevyte et al. [20] and the Ofgem Project Discovery studies [43,44] included a 
simple sensitivity analysis. Nearly all studies incorporated pathways with restricted 
availability of different low-carbon generation options, such as nuclear and CCS. Only 
a single study explored electricity sector pathways under conditions where bioenergy 
was restricted [21], although the UK Committee for Climate Change (CCC) has 
explored UK bioenergy availability in depth in other work [53].  
Many pathways relied on static technology-specific costs for low-carbon generation 
technologies and did not explore uncertainties surrounding their future variation 
through time. Just over half of the reviewed studies explored variation in fuel costs 
and underlying growth in energy service demands, although only a few studies 
considered these elements simultaneously. Finally, most studies explored the impact 
of varying levels of policy support, with some explicitly considering cases involving 
the failure of UK climate policy (London School of Economics [47], and National Grid 
[21]). These studies showed wider ranges when compared with those that evaluated 
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costs under pathways designed to achieve climate targets (such as Trutnevyte et al. 
[20]). 
This review of the existing investment estimates shows that no past work has 
simultaneously considered the key uncertainty dimensions identified. These studies 
have investment estimates that diverge from both the historical experience and from 
each other through very different sensitivities and end points. This gives the intended 
policy audience a restricted view on the landscape of possible future investment 
requirements. Depending on which study is reviewed, the intended audience might 
conclude that investment requirements either need to be massively increased when 
compared with the past, or not to increase at all. There is therefore a need for a more 
systematic approach to be taken towards UK electricity sector investment appraisal in 
the period to 2050.  
 
4.0 The state of the art in energy systems models and uncertainty analysis 
Energy economy models have seen long and extensive use for exploring technology 
pathways and the associated costs of achieving climate targets in the UK [54,55] and 
internationally [56]. Bottom-up energy system optimisation models (ESOMs), such as 
TIMES [57], OSEMoSYS [58], or MESSAGE [59], are among the most popular models 
used for national-scale energy policy analysis and decarbonisation pathway planning. 
The main strength of such models is their ability to explore trade-offs between 
different technologies and to simultaneously evaluate pathways that consider all 
energy using sectors of the economy from a whole systems perspective. Typically, 
these models are employed in a deterministic fashion, producing a single pathway of 
the future evolution of the energy system for each set of input assumptions. This 
single pathway relies on a linear programing approach that optimises the total costs 
of the whole modelled system. Such an approach delivers solutions that are assumed 
to arise from the action of a benevolent social planning agent maximising the total 
welfare in the system [60].  
The global optimum solution is sometimes found at a very sharp peak or a deep 
trough in the multidimensional problem space and can be fragile when subjected to 
even small variations in input conditions [61]. It is sometimes argued that in the real 
world, under conditions of deep uncertainty, truly optimal solutions often do not exist 
[62]. A recent retrospective review of the UK electricity sector transition between 
1990 and 2014 also found that a cost optimisation approach did not approximate real-
world developments [63]. Estimates of the total system costs deviated by 9-23% and 
actual plant deployments were qualitatively very different between the modelled 
cost-optimal pathway and the real-world transition. These shortcomings point to the 
need for an expanded consideration of uncertainty in energy systems models [64].  
Our approach, as demonstrated in this paper, is to combine the strengths of a whole 
system cost optimisation model with an advanced model for exploring patterns in 
uncertain futures. This approach analyses both strictly cost-optimised pathways as 
well as pathways that are “near-optimal”. We employ a scenario-based approach to 
explore policy uncertainties that lead to changes in energy demand and GHG 
emissions [65]. To explore parameter uncertainty, we employ Monte Carlo 
simulation, where the input parameters are randomly sampled from user defined 
distributions of input variables [66]. Finally, to explore structural uncertainty we use 
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the Modelling to Generate Alternatives (MGA) technique. MGA explores the space 
around a global optimum by allowing deviations from cost optimality, helping to 
address structural uncertainties that arise when the real-world transition deviates 
from the cost drivers [67–70]. 
This novel combined approach retains the strengths of a whole system energy 
economy model while offering new insights into the deep uncertainties surrounding 
the future evolution of the UK power sector, the decarbonisation of which is a key 
element in the energy and industrial strategy for the country [17–19]. While the UK 
context remains the focus of the paper, the insights are both novel and relevant for 
researchers and policymakers in other countries seeking to decarbonise their 
economies under the Paris Agreement. 
 
5.0 Method 
5.1 Model background and key features 
In order to systematically explore a range of UK electricity sector transition pathways 
between 2010 and 2050, and appraise the associated investment costs in line with the 
study objectives outlined in Section 2.0, we employ a pair of energy system models, 
UKTM and D-EXPANSE. In this section, we first describe the background and key 
features of each of these models in turn, before illustrating their combined 
application. 
 
5.1.1 UKTM 
The UK TIMES Model (UKTM) [11], is a technology-rich partial equilibrium energy 
system optimisation model with perfect foresight, based on the International Energy 
Agency’s Energy Technology Systems Analysis Programme (IEA-ETSAP) model 
generator [71,72]. UKTM was developed at the UCL Energy Institute as the successor 
to the UK-MARKAL model [73], which was used to underpin key decisions on UK 
energy policy from 2003-2013 [54]. The MARKAL and TIMES models have been used 
in the UK for much of the last decade to provide a whole systems perspective on 
decarbonisation pathways across the energy supply, industry, buildings, industry and 
transport sectors. As well as being used extensively for academic research [11,14,74–
79], the models have played an important role in providing the evidence base for key 
energy strategy publications by the UK’s Committee on Climate Change (CCC) and 
the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) [13,18,19,80,81] as well as 
supporting UK efforts under the United Nations Deep Decarbonization Pathways 
Project [82]. UKTM use continues in government under the recently formed UK 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) following DECC’s 
closure. Full documentation for UKTM can be found online [83]. 
According to the taxonomy of energy economic models by Hourcade et al. [84], 
UKTM is a bottom-up model that majors on technological detail rather than macro-
economic completeness. UKTM employs linear programming to make technology 
and fuel choices under greenhouse gas (GHG) emission and resource constraints. The 
model also includes other constraints, such as limits on technology build rates, and 
demand and supply matching in different diurnal and seasonal time periods to impart 
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a degree of operational realism. A strength of UKTM for exploring energy transitions 
is that it captures the whole energy system and can account for cross-sector 
interactions, such as the allocation of scarce biomass resources between electricity 
generation, industry, transport, and heating [76]. In this study, UKTM is used to 
explore the energy economy wide picture and generate logically consistent whole 
system policy scenarios that provide boundary conditions for D-EXPANSE (discussed 
in more detail below in Section 5.2). These include pathway trajectories for future 
electricity demand and GHG emissions levels that are consistent with the UK energy 
system transforming to achieve different climate policy targets. 
 
5.1.2 D-EXPANSE 
Like UKTM, D-EXPANSE (Dynamic version of EXploration of PAtterns in Near-
optimal energy ScEnarios) is a technology-rich bottom-up optimisation model with 
perfect foresight. D-EXPANSE builds on past work using the EXPANSE methodology, 
described in [70]. As the model involves a set of highly computationally intensive 
techniques, D-EXPANSE focuses on representing the electricity sector only, rather 
than the whole energy system. D-EXPANSE can be distinguished from other 
optimisation tools through two key features that are not simultaneously combined in 
any other UK energy system models: 
i. D-EXPANSE employs Monte Carlo simulation to take into account 
parametric uncertainty, e.g. exploring various assumptions for future 
technology costs, technology performance, or other key inputs. 
 
ii. D-EXPANSE not only assesses cost-optimal pathways, but also uses a 
Modelling-to-Generate Alternatives approach [67–70] to explore the 
pathways that lie in the near-optimal region around the mathematically 
least-cost solution. As the diversity of such near-optimal solutions is 
vast, an algorithm to select a small number of maximally-different 
pathways is then used [63,70]. Such an approach allows D-EXPANSE to 
consider some structural uncertainties due to energy transition 
deviations from a pure cost rationale. In this study, a deviation of up to 
15% in total system costs from the cost-optimal pathway is assumed; 
this is consistent with the past evidence [63]. 
D-EXPANSE significantly expands the consideration of uncertainty in energy system 
modelling due to the combination of Monte Carlo and Modelling-to-Generate 
Alternatives techniques. The model simultaneously generates and analyses a large 
ensemble of energy pathways (in this study, we explore 400 pathways for each D-
EXPANSE run: this is made up of 20 Monte Carlo runs with 20 cost-optimal and near-
optimal pathways for each). This allows for a systematic appraisal of investment costs 
associated with these multiple pathways. Full documentation for EXPANSE is 
provided in [63]. The model has also been tested in a multi-model comparison with 
other UK energy models [85].  
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5.2 Combined UKTM and D-EXPANSE analysis approach 
Future energy system transitions are likely to involve a broad range of technologies 
and involve complex interactions between vectors such as electricity, heating, and 
transport. Analysis must therefore go beyond considering a single sector or a small 
range of technologies [86–88]. While the focus of the analysis in this paper, as 
outlined in the study objectives (Section 2.0), is resolving the myriad uncertainties 
facing future power sector investment, there is an obvious requirement to carry out 
this work within the context of a whole-system analysis of energy system 
decarbonisation. To achieve this, we combine for the first time the whole energy 
system model UKTM with the advanced exploratory pathway generator model D-
EXPANSE. The relationship between the two models is illustrated below in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 – Analysis approach combining UKTM with D-EXPANSE 
 
 
Figure 2 can be understood as a step-by-step process by following labels (1-6):  
 
 
1) UKTM carries out a cost optimal evaluation of future changes to energy 
demand, GHG emissions, and technological diffusion in multiple sectors 
of the energy economy, including buildings, industry, transport, and 
energy supply. 
 
2) UKTM is used to determine the energy economy-wide picture for future 
energy transitions over the period 2010-2050. Climate policy is a major 
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driver of key system attributes such as technological change, total 
energy demand, and what fraction of key end-use sectors such as 
heating and transport become electrified. In this analysis we run UKTM 
twice to consider two different transitions. These represent two possible 
extremes for future national climate policy. We investigate: 
 
 A No Climate Policy case (U1) where the energy system 
transition is guided by demand growth, technology 
availability and costs, being totally unconstrained by any 
policy requirement to reduce GHG emissions.  
 
 An 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions case (U2), where 
transitions must simultaneously meet growth in demand but 
also achieve UK national climate targets for 2050. This leads 
to strong increases in electricity demand due to heat and 
transport electrification as well as a technological shift 
towards low-carbon sources of electricity. 
 
3) By taking into account the changes to energy demand and new 
technologies being deployed in other sectors in order to achieve the 
GHG targets specified by the policy conditions under (2), UKTM 
estimates the electricity demand and the emissions trajectory for the 
power sector under cost-optimal conditions. Electricity demand and 
power sector emissions over the period 2010-2050 are passed as 
constraints to D-EXPANSE.  
 
4) D-EXPANSE is then used to explore a broad range of cost-optimal and 
near-optimal electricity generation pathways for the power sector that 
satisfy the electricity demand supplied by UKTM. 
 
5) For each set of demand assumptions from UKTM, D-EXPANSE explores 
400 separate pathways for the power sector, taking into account 
uncertainties in technology performance, technology costs, technology 
lifetimes, and plant operation (how much demand is met by each 
technology). No previous study simultaneous combines these elements. 
 
6) The final set of results comprises 800 separate pathways for the 
evolution of the power sector. 
 
5.3 Modelling assumptions    
Both UKTM and D-EXPANSE consider energy transitions through time from 2010-
2050 in 5-year intervals. Key model assumptions that affect fundamental 
considerations such as energy demand and GHG emissions are aligned with standard 
UK government assumptions used in decarbonisation pathway planning. These 
include an annual average GDP (gross domestic product) growth of 2.4% [89], and 
annual average population growth of 0.5% [90], which drives end-use demands in the 
UKTM model for energy services (heating, appliances, lighting, mobility, etc.). 
Industrial demand drivers are calibrated against outputs from the UK Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) as described in previous work using UKTM by Fais 
et al. [11]. 
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The actual final demands for energy commodities such as electricity, heat and gas are 
computed endogenously by UKTM under the two umbrella scenarios U1 and U1, 
described above in Section 5.2, and are affected by considerations such as 
technological change and energy efficiency. This enables the model to use 
technological improvements to offset growth in demand if these choices are 
affordable and lie on the cost optimal pathway. Key results from UKTM are discussed 
later in Section 6.0. 
In D-EXPANSE, carbon pricing under the 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions scenario is 
based on guidelines for carbon valuation by DECC [91], while there is no carbon price 
signal applied in the No Climate Policy scenario. Fossil fuel prices are based on UK 
government projections [92], while the future costs and performance for energy 
generation technologies and their economic lifetimes are based on a series of reports 
commissioned by the UK government from major engineering consultancies [93–95]. 
The analysis explicitly takes into account future changes to costs and performance for 
different power sector technologies, such as reflecting the falling costs for renewable 
energy generation. Monte Carlo simulation is used in D-EXPANSE to explore how 
variation in these key uncertainties results in different power sector pathways. 
A summary of key input parameters is given below in Table 2. Documentation for 
technology representation in IEA-ETSAP models can be found in work by Loulou et al. 
[71,72]. Detailed assumptions for the settings used in D-EXPANSE, including 
technological characterisation, are provided as Supplementary Material to the online 
version of this paper.  
 
Table 2 – Key model input parameters for UKTM and D-EXPANSE 
Parameter Source Implementation 
Energy service demands 
Based on UK Department of 
Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) [96], Office for 
National Statistics [90], 
Office for Budget 
Responsibility [89] 
Time series, 2010-2050, in 5-year intervals;  
Central drivers used for major end-use sectors (residential, 
commercial, industrial, transport) in order to align with 
standard UK government assumptions, including GDP 
growth of 2.4% and population growth of 0.5% to 2050. 
Base year power generation 
technology portfolio and existing 
plant decommissioning profile  
Based on UK Department of 
Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) [97] 
UKTM and D-EXPANSE both calibrated to base year 2010. 
Fossil fuel prices and carbon pricing 
Based UK Department of 
Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) [91] and [92] 
Time series, 2010-2050, in 5-year intervals; 
Transposition to UKTM uses Central Projections; 
Implementation in D-EXPANSE uses High, Central, Low 
ranges as basis for distributions. 
Power generation capital costs, 
operation and maintenance costs, 
and economic lifetimes 
Based on consultant reports 
for the UK Department of 
Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) by Parsons 
Brinckerhoff [93,94] and 
Arup [95] 
Time series 2010-2050, in 5-year intervals; 
Implementation in D-EXPANSE uses High, Central, Low 
ranges as basis for distributions; 
So-called “First of a Kind (FOAK)” costs applied for fossil 
thermal CCS and nuclear costs to 2024, with “Nth of a Kind 
(NOAK)” costs, intended to reflect more mature technology 
developments applied thereafter; 
Real costs for key renewable energy resources such as 
offshore wind and solar photovoltaics assumed to fall to 2030 
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and plateau thereafter in line with UK government 
assumptions. 
Power sector capacity margin 
Historically, the UK's Central Electricity Generating Board would have based system planning 
requirements on a capacity margin of 20% during the period of public ownership of the 
electricity system between 1957-1990 [98].  
Power sector discount rate UK Treasury [99] 
UK government guidelines for policy assessment are to use a 
social discount rate of 3.5% to 2040 and 3% thereafter. 
Demand and plant operation 
assumptions 
As described in the UKTM 
[83] and D-EXPANSE 
documentations [63] 
UKTM features 16 different time-slices for supply-demand 
balancing, and distinguishes between four diurnal time 
periods (night, day, evening peak, late evening) and four 
seasonal time periods (winter, spring, summer, autumn); 
D-EXPANSE model supply-demand constraints for peak load, 
shoulder load, and base load only. 
 
6.0 Results 
6.1 System level energy and emissions trajectories 
Figure 3 shows the energy and emissions trajectories for the two umbrella scenarios 
used in this paper, U1 and U2, and how they compare against 11 key low carbon 
scenarios from the UK literature on decarbonisation pathway analysis. These include 
3 scenarios from the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) [100,101], 3 scenarios for 
the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) [102], 2 scenarios for the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) [103], and 3 scenarios from the UK’s Deep 
Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP) [82]. All scenarios (with the exception of 
U1, No Climate Policy) were carried out in the context of exploring UK pathways to 
achieving an 80% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050, compared to 1990 levels. 
Overall, Figure 3 shows that the U1 and U2 umbrella scenarios used in this study are 
fairly typical in energy consumption terms when compared to studies found in the 
literature, while the U2 scenario also mirrors the steep decline in emissions found in 
past work. 
Differences between the decarbonisation trajectories in the scenarios arise mainly 
from three sources: different treatment of non-CO2 GHGs and international aviation 
and shipping, different base year conditions, and variation in the underlying demand, 
cost and performance data. The DDPP and U1/U2 scenarios both use the UKTM 
model which considers all GHG emissions, while the DECC, CCC and UKERC scenarios 
use the older UK-MARKAL model, which considered CO2 emissions only. A number of 
the scenarios using UK-MARKAL (i.e. some of the DECC, CCC, and UKERC scenarios 
in Figure 3) aimed for deeper cuts to CO2 emissions (e.g. a 90% reduction target) to 
allow headroom for other non-CO2 GHGs, and to make allowances for emissions from 
the UK’s share of international aviation and shipping. The scenarios using UKTM (U1, 
U2, and the DDPP scenarios) on the other hand consider all GHGs as well as 
international aviation and shipping endogenously. Other differences between results 
in Figure 3 occur from UK-MARKAL being calibrated to operate from 2000-2050, 
while UKTM is set to cover the period 2010-2050, and because models are frequently 
updated over time to reflect the latest demand, cost and technology performance 
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data, as well as the latest climate science on issues such as land use change. These 
differences in the underlying data cause further variation between results.  
Figure 3 – Comparison of total energy and emissions trajectories 
 
 
Figure 4 further disaggregates final energy consumption into key end-use sectors. As 
expected, the U1 and U2 scenarios show very similar trends to the DDPP model runs 
because they both use the UKTM model and the UK government’s latest demand, 
cost, and technology data. They show higher residential energy consumption than 
many of the past studies using UK-MARKAL, but also show much lower industrial 
energy consumption. This possibly reflects the more detailed characterisation of the 
industrial sector and its technology options found in UKTM as compared to UK-
MARKAL, as well as the government’s latest view on future industrial sector structure 
[11]. Future energy use in the commercial and transport sectors for U1 and U2 are 
within the ranges shown in past studies and are found to be most closely aligned with 
the DDPP and UKERC scenarios. 
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Figure 4 – Comparison of final energy consumption by end-use sector 
 
 
6.2 Energy consumption and GHG emissions 
Figure 5 illustrates outputs from UKTM for final energy consumption (in petajoules, 
PJ) and GHG emissions (in megatonnes of CO2 equivalent, MtCO2eq) across all 
modelled sectors and energy vectors. Three sets of data are visualised so that starting 
condition for the model in the 2010 base year can be compared against the final 2050 
conditions from the two scenario pathways No Climate Policy, and 80% Reduction in 
GHG Emissions. Figure 5 shows that both 2050 scenarios see absolute reductions in 
energy consumption when compared with the starting year of 2010 as more efficient 
technologies are deployed in spite of population growth and increased industrial and 
service sector demand. 
In terms of GHG emissions, Figure 5 shows that these were 659 MtCO2eq in the 2010 
starting year. In the No Climate Policy scenario, some decarbonisation does occur in 
the period to 2050 as the relative costs of alternatives to fossil fuel technologies 
change across the time horizon. For example, low carbon energy supply costs fall and 
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energy efficiency technologies become more widespread. These effects cause the No 
Climate Policy scenario to reduce GHG emissions to 474 MtCO2eq by 2050.  
In the 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions scenario, the uptake of low carbon 
technologies is significantly accelerated due to the binding emissions constraint used 
in the model i.e. the model must optimise technology selection to achieve the UK’s 
2050 target. Under these conditions, not only is there rapid uptake of energy 
efficiency options but negative emissions sequestration technologies such as 
bioenergy with CCS become economically attractive. Net emissions in 2050 are 228 
MtCO2eq, with significant emission reductions in buildings, industry and transport. 
This chart also shows that the power sector must become completely decarbonised in 
order for the energy system to achieve national targets. 
Figure 5 – Total final energy consumption and emissions by sector 
 
 
6.3 Electricity consumption and electrification of end-use sectors 
Figure 6 illustrates key trends in electricity consumption that occur in the umbrella 
scenarios, focusing in particular on heating and transport. Total modelled 
consumption in 2010 is 1218 PJ (338 TWh). Under the No Climate Policy scenario, 
electricity consumption falls in the period to 2050 by 30% to 852 PJ (237 TWh), due to 
increased efficiency and shifts in industrial energy use. Under the 80% Reduction in 
GHG Emissions scenario, electricity consumption in 2050 remains at similar overall 
levels to 2010, standing at 1252 PJ (348 TWh). The higher overall electricity use for the 
80% Reduction in GHG Emissions scenario arises from an increased use of 
decarbonised electricity for heating and transport purposes as well as for industry, 
where there is a shift away from fossil fuel processes to more manufactured fuels such 
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as hydrogen. The electrification of heating and transport is particularly pronounced in 
the 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions case, where it more than doubles from 196 PJ 
(54 TWh) in 2010 to 470 PJ (131 TWh) in 2050. 
Figure 6 – Electricity consumption by end-use 
 
6.4 Power sector technology pathways  
As described in Section 5.2, each of the two umbrella scenarios (U1, U2) are 
implemented in D-EXPANSE with aforementioned inputs from UKTM. D-EXPANSE 
then generates an ensemble of pathways by combining Monte Carlo sampling and 
the MGA approach. For each umbrella scenario, 20 Monte Carlo runs are carried out. 
For every Monte Carlo run, one optimal pathway and 19 near-optimal pathways are 
generated. This gives an ensemble of 400 individual pathways for each of the two 
umbrella scenarios (800 in total). In each of the 800 pathways, the deployment of 
different technologies can vary significantly. In this section we illustrate the variation 
in deployment across all 800 pathways for different power generation technologies, 
including electricity from fossil fuels (with and without CCS), nuclear power, and 
renewable energy.  
 
6.4.1 Fossil fuel generation 
Figure 7 illustrates variation in fossil fired power plant deployment in umbrella 
scenarios U1 (No Climate Policy) and U2 (80% Reduction in GHG Emissions). Under 
conditions without emissions constraints (Figure 7a), it can be seen that there are 
many cost-optimal and near-optimal outcomes in which the deployment of coal 
power plants is significant. Coal power plant capacity in some pathways can be as 
high as 20GW. If the UK achieves deep decarbonisation on the other hand (Figure 7b), 
the role of coal is shown to be significantly reduced, with deployment always below 
5GW of capacity. This effect is also found to occur for thermal generation that 
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includes a strong coal component, such as coal and biomass co-firing (Figure 7c and 
7d). The loss of market share by coal-fired power plant in the low carbon scenario 
results in other technologies being deployed to fill the gap in supply requirements. 
This can be seen clearly in later sections. 
The observations for natural gas fired generation are more nuanced. Low carbon 
policies appear to increase the deployment of open cycle gas turbines (OCGTs) while 
decreasing the potential for combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs). OCGTs serve a 
core function in the UK power system by providing balancing services to the grid. Grid 
balancing is a requirement in both umbrella scenarios U1 and U2. OCGTs in this 
analysis show a similar total range of deployment between the maximum and 
minimum values in both umbrella scenarios. However, most of the modelled 
pathways under the No Climate Policy case (Figure 7e)  feature a low installed base of 
OCGTs (<10GW) when compared to the 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions case (Figure 
7f). Under the 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions scenario, there is a more uniform 
range of outcomes between the minima and maxima found for OCGT installed 
capacity (Figure 7f) i.e. more of the pathways rely on OCGTs for balancing (up to 
~20GW). This indicates that more pathways in the climate constrained world show an 
increased requirement for peaking plants. This is correlated with increased use of 
renewable power (Section 6.4.4). 
Combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs), together with coal and nuclear plants, provide 
the UK’s current baseload electricity generation. Under the No Climate Policy case 
(Figure 7g), there is less variation in CCGT deployment and most pathways only 
deploy up to 10GW of CCGTs because coal power, which is cost competitive with gas, 
remains an important player. Under the 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions case (Figure 
7h), there is a much wider range of potential outcomes, including cases where up to 
30GW of CCGTs are used. This wide variation in CCGT deployment in the near-
optimal pathways for the low GHG umbrella scenario can be attributed to both the 
constraints placed on coal due to its high per unit emissions on the one hand, and 
CCGT competition with other baseload technologies such as nuclear power and fossil 
fuel plants with CCS (see Sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3) on the other. 
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Figure 7 - Fossil fuel generation in cost-optimal and near-optimal pathways 
under umbrella scenarios U1 and U2 
 
 20 
 
6.4.2 Fossil fuel generation with CCS 
Figure 8 illustrates variation in the deployment of fossil fuelled power plants with CCS 
in the umbrella scenarios U1 (No Climate Policy) and U2 (80% Reduction in GHG 
Emissions). With No Climate Policy, the installed capacity of both coal and gas CCS 
plant reaches almost 20GW (Figures 8a and 8c), while under an 80% Reduction in GHG 
Emissions, it can be as high as 30GW (Figures 8b and 8d).  Implementing a binding 
national climate target therefore significantly increases the number of pathways that 
include fossil generation with CCS, which is intuitive as there exists a cap on GHG 
emissions released to atmosphere.  
However, the range of installed capacity outcomes under umbrella scenario U2, both 
for coal CCS and gas CCS, is large and some pathways include little or no CCS plant. 
This broad range of possible outcomes reflects the fact that these technologies are 
broadly interchangeable with one other (in cost and performance terms) as well as 
with other forms of low carbon generation, such as natural gas (Section 6.4.1), 
nuclear power (Section 6.4.3) or renewables (Section 6.4.4). The closer that the total 
costs of these technologies are to one another, the greater the degree of 
interchangeability observed in the near-optimal space.  
Figure 8 – Fossil fuelled plants with CCS in cost-optimal and near-optimal 
pathways under umbrella scenarios U1 and U2 
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6.4.3 Nuclear power 
Figure 9 illustrates variation in nuclear power deployment between scenarios U1 and 
U2. There is a broad range of outcomes for all pathways, which reflects the 
competition faced by nuclear power from other centralised power generation 
technologies such as coal and gas CCS. The maximum potential for nuclear power 
found under the pathways explored with No Climate Policy (Figure 9a) is found to be 
around 20GW, while under an 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions (Figure 9b) it is as high 
as 32GW. This reflects an increased demand for low carbon sources of baseload 
electricity generation in pathways that include for climate policy considerations and a 
loss of market share for unabated coal and gas generation (Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2).   
Figure 9 - Nuclear power in in cost-optimal and near-optimal pathways under 
umbrella scenarios U1 and U2 
 
 
6.4.4 Renewable technologies 
Figure 10 illustrates variation in the deployment of wind and solar power and Figure 
11 shows the deployment of marine and biomass technologies. The D-EXPANSE 
model also considers hydropower, biogas, and electricity generation from waste, but 
they are not illustrated here due to their relatively minor role in the overall modelled 
UK electricity mix. It can be seen from Figure 10 that a significant deployment of 
renewable technologies is possible by 2050 in pathways modelled under both the No 
Climate Policy (U1) and 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions (U2) scenarios. The results 
show that a greater number of pathways tend to make use of onshore and offshore 
wind resources when the model is run with a climate target (see Figures 10b and 10d).  
Deployments of solar PV capacity of up to 20GW by 2050 are found in both the U1 
and U2 cases (see Figures 10e and 10f). Interestingly the pathway assessment finds 
that the deployment of solar PV is lower after 2035 in the climate-constrained world 
of U2 than in the unconstrained U1 scenario. This result stems from the fact that 
under the U2 scenario a large stock of low-carbon technologies must already installed 
by the year 2030 in order to replace decommissioned fossil fuel-based generation that 
reaches the end of its lifecycle in the 2020’s. Solar PV, which has comparable costs to 
other low-carbon technologies by 2030, does see deployment in most pathways 
during this period, but begins to face increased competition from wind, nuclear and 
 22 
CCS after 2030. These technologies push the total system costs up, crowding out 
additional deployment of solar PV, whose low capacity factor still results in relatively 
high overall costs despite technology learning effects bringing down its capital costs. 
Solar PV also contributes relatively little to capacity required for meeting peak 
electricity demand and is thus outperformed by other low-carbon technologies. In the 
U1 case the total system costs are lower due to the significant capacity of cheaper 
coal and gas generation. Near-optimal U1 pathways can thus accommodate costlier 
solar PV without raising the total system costs beyond the near-optimal threshold. An 
expanded discussion of our observations on investment costs can be found in 
Sections 6.6 and 6.7. 
Figure 10 - Wind and solar power plants in cost-optimal and near-optimal 
pathways under umbrella scenarios U1 and U2 
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Figure 11 shows that marine and biomass power see limited deployment across all 
pathways, due to restricted resource availability. There is however, an increased 
density of pathways above the zero line for all technologies under the low GHG 
umbrella scenario U2 (Figures 11b, 11d, and 11f). As with other pathways explored 
under the 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions scenario, this reflects an increased 
demand for low-carbon power and the displacement of unabated coal and natural gas 
plant. 
Figure 11 - Marine and biomass power plants in cost-optimal and near-
optimal pathways under umbrella scenarios U1 and U2 
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6.5 Maximally-different pathways 
Section 6.4 discussed the variation in deployment levels for individual technologies 
under cost-optimal and near-optimal pathways, but did not illustrate how these 
technologies combine into complete transition pathways. A key feature of D-
EXPANSE is the identification of pathways within the near-optimal space that are 
“maximally different” from one another. By “maximally different”, we mean that 
these scenarios are a subset of the total ensemble of simulated pathways that differ 
from each other as widely as possible. This is determined using an adapted distance-
to-selected algorithm using harmonic averages [104], as described in previous work 
using the EXPANSE methodology [70].  
Figure 12 illustrates nine maximally-different pathways from the 400 pathways 
generated for umbrella scenario U2. All of the pathways start with the same power 
sector technology portfolio in 2010, but ultimately arrive at very different places by 
the year 2050. For example, some pathways  show a transition towards a future 
characterised primarily by large centrally dispatched technologies such as CCGTs coal 
and gas CCS, and nuclear power (Figures 12a, 12e, 12f, 12h), while other pathways 
demonstrate combinations of central generation with wind and solar power (Figures 
12b, 12c, 12g). Finally, there are examples of highly diverse pathways that include 
roles for nearly all modelled technologies (Figures 12d, 12i). 
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Figure 12 – Examples of nine maximally-different pathways in umbrella 
scenario U2 
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While Figure 12 shows a number of example transitions through time, Figure 13 
focuses on the maximally-different power sector portfolios for the target year of 
2050, comparing the results from the No Climate Policy (U1) umbrella scenario against 
those that achieve an 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions (U2). The installed capacity for 
power generation in the No Climate Policy Case is generally found in the region of 60 
– 77GW, while under an 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions it is much higher, being 
between 100GW and 130GW. The large difference arises from fundamental 
differences in electricity demand between the two umbrella scenarios. The whole 
energy system model runs carried out under UKTM show that to meet climate targets 
under umbrella scenario U2 there is a significant increase in electricity consumption 
associated with electrification of end-use demands such as building heating and 
transport (Sections 6.2 and 6.3). Another factor contributing to higher installed 
capacities under umbrella scenario U2, is that many of the sources of low-carbon 
energy that are deployed are intermittent in nature, and require additional supporting 
generation plant to cover periods when they do not operate. 
Many observations regarding technological variation, previously discussed in Section 
6.4, can also be recognised in this diagram. For example, there are more pathways 
with a high deployment of CCGTs under the climate constrained scenario (U2), and 
much fewer employing unabated coal fired power plants. Overall there is a high 
diversity of pathways that fall within the cost-optimal and the near-optimal range, a 
finding that is consistent with previous MGA exercises [63,68]. This diversity reveals 
the multiplicity of future options for decarbonising the UK power sector that could 
evolve under future government policy choices, governance arrangements, and 
market developments. 
Figure 13 – Maximally-different pathways in 2050 for umbrella scenarios U1 
and U2 
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6.6 Cumulative investment costs 
Rather than present an investment appraisal for each and every single one of the 400 
pathways assessed for each of the two umbrella scenario (U1 and U2), we instead 
compare distributions of results to understand the broad patterns or trends that 
emerge from the analysis. Figure 14 compares the temporal distribution of 
cumulative total investment costs into UK electricity generation as a whole. Boxplots 
are used to illustrate the mean, the interquartile range (between the 25th and 75th 
percentile), and the maximum and minimum estimates for all pathways. It can be 
seen immediately in Figure 14 that the tails of the investment cost distributions are 
very long. This is to be expected, as a broad range of uncertainties, including 
technology characteristics, costs, climate policy considerations and the final demand 
for electricity are accounted for. Figure 14 also shows that the level of uncertainty in 
the cost estimates for all pathways increases through time.  
Considering both the maxima and minima across all cost pathways, Figure 14 shows 
that under the No Climate Policy scenario, cumulative investment costs range from 
£45bn to £110bn, while under an 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions, they are between 
£75 and 210bn. If the more extreme outliers are not considered and we focus on the 
interquartile ranges, we find that cumulative investment costs for the No Climate 
Policy scenario are between £60bn and £75bn, while under an 80% Reduction in GHG 
Emissions they are between £110 and £140bn. In general terms therefore, it can be 
seen that achieving UK policy targets for 2050 approximately doubles the investment 
required in the power sector under most of the possible technology pathways. This 
finding is consistent with observations made in Section 6.3, which show that 
achieving climate targets may require large increases in installed capacity owing to 
the electrification of significant end-use sectors such as transport and heating. Not 
only is there an increase in capacity, but there is also a shift towards low carbon 
generation, which also increases costs further. This is because many low-carbon 
technologies are capital-intensive, and replace fossil fuel based plants that have high 
operational rather than investment costs. Another contributing factor is the 
intermittent nature of many sources of low carbon electricity, which leads to 
additional investment in supporting generation capacity. 
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Figure 14 – Comparison of cumulative investment costs for umbrella 
scenarios U1 and U2. The boxplots depict mean, 25th and 75th percentiles, 
upper and lower bound of cumulative investments costs. 
 
 
6.7 Annual investment costs 
Figure 15 illustrates variation in annual investment costs for each umbrella scenario. 
As with Figure 14, the tails of the distributions in Figure 15 are again very long due to 
the vast diversity of plausible pathways found in the near-optimal space. Figure 15 
shows that there is a range of investment patterns through the time horizon, and that 
there are instances of pathways with very low annual investment in one time segment 
followed by very high annual investment in the next segment, and vice versa. Looking 
at the interquartile ranges and comparing between the two umbrella scenarios (U1, 
U2), it can be seen that most pathways have distinct peaks in investment levels at 
similar time periods. The first peak in investments for most pathways occurs after 5 
years of model time, in 2015, and is associated with the retirement of existing UK 
fossil fuelled generation capacity (much of which is due to be decommissioned before 
2020). The second peak occurs 15 years into the time horizon in 2030. It can also be 
seen that the pattern of investment in the period 2035 – 2050 is different in both 
cases. We can compare these three distinctive periods as follows: 
 2015 investment peak: under the No Climate Policy scenario, the 
interquartile range is between £2.5bn/year and £3.5bn/year, while under 
an 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions it is slightly higher and between 
£4bn/year and £4.75bn/year. 
 
 2030 investment peak: under the No Climate Policy scenario, the 
interquartile range is between £3.25bn/year and 5bn/year, while under 
an 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions is it generally much higher and 
between £4.75bn/year and £7.5bn/year 
 
 2035-2050 period: under the No Climate Policy scenario, investment 
levels fall to around £1-2bn/year and remain £1bn/year or less thereafter. 
Under an 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions, annual investments do not 
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fall down to very low levels after peaking in 2030, but actually stay in the 
range £1-6bn/year. 
These findings are consistent with observations made for total cumulative investment 
found in Section 6.6. They demonstrate that technology pathways under the low 
carbon scenario have higher investment requirements and that much of the 
additional investment actually occurs in the period 2030-2050. 
Figure 15 – Comparison of annual investment costs for U1 and U2 umbrella 
scenarios. The boxplots depict mean, 25th and 75th percentiles, upper and 
lower bound of cumulative investments costs. 
 
 
7.0 Discussion 
7.1 Comparison with past studies  
As highlighted in the introductory framing for this paper (Section 1.0), there is an 
urgent requirement for countries to develop strategies for deep decarbonisation of 
their energy systems in line with global agreements on climate change mitigation. In 
the UK, one of the major policy uncertainties is understanding how much investment 
needs to be mobilised for the energy transition, particularly in the power sector. Our 
literature review (Section 3.0) finds that while UK climate targets are for 2050, past 
estimates of investment requirements to transform the power system have tended to 
only focus on the 2030 period and to only explore a relatively narrow range of future 
uncertainties. An important and policy relevant application of energy models is 
therefore to quantify future investment requirements into the power sector in the 
period to 2050 and expand the consideration of uncertainty. 
This study demonstrates a novel approach that compares and contrasts 800 separate 
pathways for the UK power sector in the period to 2050, under two different climate 
policy conditions and a wide range of variations in future technology and cost 
parameters. This arguably represents the most wide-ranging attempt to consider 
future uncertainties facing the UK power sector to date, and is undertaken in the 
context of the decarbonisation of the whole energy system. Our approach goes 
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significantly beyond what has been attempted previously in past studies (Section 3.0), 
each of which, when taken in isolation, only presents a relatively narrow and arguably 
subjective viewpoint on possible developments rather than revealing the actual broad 
scope of future possibilities. 
The range of annual investment rates found in historical transitions is £3-11bn/year, 
while estimates from other studies for future investment requirements (when 
focusing on those figures that cover power generation only, rather than the whole 
electricity system) are for 2-9bn/year. The annual investment rates shown in Figure 15 
illustrate that the outputs from our combined UKTM and D-EXPANSE model 
assessment spans a comparable range, and slightly beyond (some outlier pathways 
reach 13bn/year). The work presented in this paper is therefore consistent with other 
studies but demonstrates an approach that is able to explain the range of outcomes 
explored as a function of uncertain technology selection, cost, and policy 
assumptions. 
 
7.2 Implications for policy 
The work presented raises a number of important insights for energy policy in the UK. 
It first corroborates the findings of other analyses that demonstrate the requirement 
for a massive investment in new generation capacity if the UK is to meet its 2050 
climate targets. The power generation pathways found within the cost-optimal and 
near-optimal space under stringent climate constraints (the 80% Reduction in GHG 
Emissions umbrella scenario) all involved 2050 generation capacities above 100 GW, in 
comparison to pathways found under the No Climate Policy scenario, which featured 
capacities in the 60-75 GW range (Section 6.5).  
We find that, in general terms, a power sector transition pathway to 2050 without any 
form of GHG emissions policy requires cumulative investments of between £60bn and 
£75bn. Pathways that meet UK climate policy targets for 2050 on the other hand, 
require a doubling of cumulative investment requirements to between £110 and 
£140bn (Section 6.6). The model assessment also gives some insights into the 
profiling of investments through time. We find that not only are peaks in power sector 
investment likely to be higher when meeting climate targets, but that a large portion 
of the difference in future costs occurs from deployment activity in the period 2030-
2050 (Section 6.7). 
In terms of technology selection, the analysis across the 800 different modelled 
pathways demonstrates that there are a very large number of different electricity 
generation mixes that lie within a relatively small, near-optimal space around the 
mathematically least cost solution (i.e. +/- 15%). Another way of looking at this is that 
many diverse technological solutions to the energy transition challenge have broadly 
similar costs. With No Climate Policy, potential for coal-fired power could be as high 
as 20GW in 2050, while under an 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions, the maximum 
observed deployment was 5GW (Section 6.4.1). The shift away from unabated coal in 
many pathways is found to be accompanied by an increased potential for low carbon 
power generation. Nuclear power, coal CCS, and gas CCS all see their maximum 
deployment potential increase from around 20GW under No Climate Policy, to 30GW 
when an 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions is pursued (Sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3). Other 
interesting features of many low carbon pathways are an increased preference for 
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renewable energy resources (Section 6.4.4) and an increased deployment of power 
plants traditionally used for system balancing such as open-cycle gas turbines 
(OCGTs).  
What does this diversity in model solutions in the near-optimal space mean for 
energy policy? Many advanced economies such as the UK have partially or wholly 
liberalised electricity markets. The UK energy market is dominated by a number of 
large energy firms, known collectively as the “Big Six” [105]. Only two of these 
companies are domestically owned, and the UK government itself does not directly 
own or operate any major parts of the electricity system. Similar market 
arrangements for the electricity sector can be found in countries as diverse as 
Germany [106], Spain [107], Chile [108], and Australia [109], while Japan is also 
observed to be moving in this direction [110]. The official UK Government position is 
to create the conditions for a market-led transition whereby the best value portfolio 
of electricity generation emerges from competition [19,23]. As fossil-fuelled 
technologies currently dominate power generation, a key role for Government is to 
provide mid-term policy support for low-carbon generation options in order that they 
can become cost-competitive with these fossil-fuelled technologies. The findings 
from our study imply that the UK Government’s stated policy of maintaining 
technology neutrality and encouraging market competition in order to drive 
decarbonisation could be viewed in a positive light [19,23]. However, whether or not 
the UK’s current market-led framework will actually able to incentivise investment at 
the levels required to drive the transition remains to be seen. 
The model results illustrate that at least £45bn will need to be found to replace aging 
generation plant in the UK whether the Government  strives to achieve its ambitious 
climate targets or not. It is expected that the majority of this capital will be found 
from the private sector and institutional investors, such as large pension funds. 
Therefore, it is critical that policymakers seek to create an attractive environment for 
investment in the period to 2030, and one that can endure thereafter as high annual 
investment rates need to be sustained to 2050 in the climate-constrained world. This 
may involve the packaging of investments so that some risks are passed to taxpayers 
and consumers, making the asset more “investable” for the financier while keeping 
the overall economic cost to society manageable [24]. Another approach is to explore 
how new capacity requirements might be met through non-traditional forms of 
ownership and financing, such as energy co-operatives [111] or energy service 
companies (ESCOs) [112]. Finally, while a return to complete state ownership of the 
electricity may seem unlikely in the context of the political preferences of successive 
UK governments for market-driven solutions [113], it is not impossible to imagine a 
role for greater state intervention (e.g. as imagined in Foxon [25,114]). Government 
can potentially borrow at extremely favourable rates and is in a position to take on 
board significant risk premiums when compared to many private firms, which raises 
the prospect of the government acting as a guarantor or counterparty for private 
sector investments [20]. 
 
7.3 Implications for research 
While our specific case study is for the UK, we can draw from our analysis a number of 
useful insights for studies of deep decarbonisation at the international level. Our work 
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shows that the common approach of assessing future investment requirements for 
energy transitions, which is to use a handful of deterministic scenarios, based on 
small sets of (at times) minimally varying assumptions, can underplay the extent to 
which plausible future pathways can differ from one another, even when incurring 
similar economic costs. This relaxed approach to uncertainty consideration has the 
effect of disguising the full spectrum of possible futures for policymakers. We find 
that this effect is present even in studies that use advanced whole energy system 
models that take into account trade-offs and interactions between diverse parts of 
the energy economy such as buildings, industry and transport. 
While whole system models of this type are useful for exploring “cost-optimal” paths, 
the fact that they are commonly used with relatively few scenarios (typically <10) 
means that they risk focusing policymaker attention on the optimal result, which is 
not necessarily more likely to occur than other near-optimal outcomes, an 
observation that is well understood in the decision theory community (e.g. see [61]). 
In complex systems with deep uncertainties it is often argued that a useful application 
of models is to bound the extremes of the problem space rather than to focus on 
producing single “optimal” pathways [63,115,116]. 
Computational limits often preclude the use of whole energy system models with 
hundreds of scenarios. We propose therefore that whole systems analysis of energy 
systems may benefit from combined application with detailed sectoral models, and 
approaches that generate large ensembles of results in order to explore parametric 
and structural uncertainties. We have demonstrated one such novel approach here by 
applying our whole system energy optimisation model UKTM in concert with the D-
EXPANSE model. UKTM provides the whole system overview, while D-EXPANSE 
performs an advanced sensitivity analysis around the optimal pathways in a single 
sector, delivering robust insights for policymakers. Researchers undertaking 
decarbonisation analysis in other countries can benefit from using similar approaches. 
Our experience in visualising and interpreting the results of the analysis here is that 
the use of large pathway ensembles in conjunction with a whole energy systems 
modelling approach creates large volumes of output data (pathways). This presents 
its own challenges for analysis and communication of insights [64]. For example, this 
study shows that the key trends from the analysis cannot be accomplished by using a 
few deterministic trend lines, but instead involves a “spaghetti” of multiple pathways 
that can overlap significantly. Many policymakers and indeed, scientists, can find this 
unsettling, and without guidance may be inclined to believe that the results mean 
that “anything can happen”. Future research on methods to reveal, visualise, 
interpret, and communicate uncertainties is therefore needed.  
There are ongoing efforts to incorporate advanced approaches for searching within 
high-dimensional results spaces for trends and patterns, such as data clustering 
techniques and machine learning [117]. For example, these approaches are starting to 
be used in global-scale climate policy assessments that rely on large pathway 
ensembles [118]. The extension of these techniques to national level energy policy 
insights is a logical progression, and the energy research community may well benefit 
from future developments in this field. As discussed above however, such approaches 
place an additional burden on both researchers and policymakers to appreciate and 
plan for uncertainty [119]. Researchers should refer to the existing literature on 
science-policy communication for guidance in this critical area (e.g. [120]). 
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8.0 Conclusions 
Past investment appraisals of the UK electricity sector transition have considered a 
relatively narrow range of uncertainties and have focused on the mid-term time 
horizon to 2030 rather than the climate policy timeframe of 2050. This paper 
addressed this gap by exploring an interlinked set of policy, technology and cost 
uncertainties related to the future UK electricity sector evolution. The analysis linked 
outputs from a whole energy economy model UKTM (UK TIMES) with the D-
EXPANSE model that generates large ensembles of cost-optimal and near-optimal 
UK electricity generation pathways. D-EXPANSE achieves this by combining Monte 
Carlo analysis with Modelling to Generate Alternatives (MGA). A large ensemble of 
800 UK electricity sector pathways was produced, spanning a much broader range of 
uncertainties than those considered in past published investment appraisals. 
The results for the 800 modelled transition pathways show that policies aimed at 
achieving climate targets are likely to significantly increase the installed capacity 
required for meeting electricity demand in 2050. With No Climate Policy, installed 
generation capacities were found in the range 60GW – 75GW, while under an 80% 
Reduction in GHG Emissions, between 100GW – 130GWof plant were required. 
Meeting climate targets for 2050 was also found to increase the investment 
requirements for new electricity generation. The interquartile range for cumulative 
investments in new generation under the No Climate Policy scenario ranged from 
£60bn – £75bn, while under an 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions, modelled investment 
requirements approximately double to £110bn - £140bn. 
An investment profiling assessment shows that capital flows into new electricity 
generation will likely need to match or exceed historical precedents of £3bn - £11bn in 
the period to 2030, regardless of whether or not climate targets are pursued or not. 
This is driven by the need to replace aging elements of the UK generation fleet that 
will see their economic lives expire during the 2020’s. Post 2030, the decision on 
whether to achieve climate targets for 2050 or not becomes crucial, because 
following a climate mitigation pathway implies the need to sustain elevated levels of 
new plant deployment and investment. With No Climate Policy, investment levels in 
new generation can fall to around £1bn annually in the period 2035-2050, while to 
achieve an 80% Reduction in GHG Emissions, they need to be sustained at levels of 
between £1bn/year - £6bn/year over the same timeframe. 
From a policy perspective, our findings align with those of other researchers that 
identify a pressing need for the UK government to incentivise investment in new low-
carbon generation. The privatised nature of the UK electricity system and the 
difficulties experienced to date in attracting capital into the sector from traditional 
sources of financing puts the government in a potentially difficult position. Resolving 
this policy challenge may require new and innovative models of ownership and 
financing such as energy co-operatives and energy services companies, and also may 
require an attractive “packaging” of investments that transfers enough of the risk 
away from investors to enable capital to flow. Politically, this could be perceived as 
less than desirable, but the UK government appears to have few alternatives beyond 
resurrecting the state ownership of energy assets, a concept to which successive UK 
governments over the last 30 years have demonstrated consistent opposition.  
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From a research perspective, this study demonstrates a novel approach that 
combines a national whole energy systems model with an exploratory pathway 
generator for delivering policy insights under deep uncertainty. The study shows that 
adequately expanding the consideration of uncertainty in energy transition modelling 
leads to large volumes of modelled pathways. Presenting the relevant findings in such 
a way that the quantitative analysis assists the decision process and does not simply 
overwhelm policymakers, and indeed researchers, with its complexity, is identified as 
being crucial to the future use of such approaches. This work also shows that cost 
minimisation as an approach to making policy decisions on energy transitions has its 
limitations, and should be augmented or complemented with techniques that tackle 
high dimensional uncertainties. Grappling with the unknown in long term energy 
studies is undoubtedly a very challenging exercise, but robust policy insights are 
unlikely to result from approaches that attempt to minimise, abstract away, or 
exclude uncertainty from the analysis. 
 
9.0 Glossary 
BEIS  UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
CCC   The UK Committee on Climate Change 
CCGT   Combined Cycle Gas Turbine 
CCS   Carbon Capture and Storage 
DECC   The UK Department of Energy and Climate Change 
EFOM  Energy Flow Optimisation Model 
IEA-ETSAP The International Energy Agency’s Energy Technology Systems 
Analysis Programme 
D-EXPANSE Dynamic version of EXploration of PAtterns in Near-optimal energy 
ScEnarios 
GHG  Greenhouse Gas 
ESOMs  Energy System Optimisation Models 
MARKAL  MARKet ALlocation Model 
MESSAGE Model for Energy Supply Systems And their General Environmental 
impact 
MGA   Modelling to Generate Alternatives  
OCGT  Open Cycle Gas Turbine 
Ofgem  UK Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
OSEMoSYS Open Source Energy Modelling System 
PV   Photovoltaics 
TIMES  The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System 
UKTM  UK TIMES Model 
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